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ENERGY POLICY AND THE TAXATION
OF OIL AND GAS INCOME
ALLAN J. LICHTENBERG*
RICHARD B. NORGAARD**

A number of special tax allowances for the extraction of oil and
gas have been developed over the years which constitute a
considerable subsidy to the oil and gas industry. Although various
"economic fairness" arguments have been raised to justify these
allowances, the most forceful arguments have always been pragmatic:
(1) The allowances are required in a high-risk industry to encourage
the capital flow required for exploration to maintain a sufficient
level of proved reserves, and (2) their elimination would cause a
substantial rise in the price of fuels. 1 These arguments have a particular thrust today in a period when the consumer is experiencing oil
and gas shortages and prices are rising steeply.
The major tax allowances in question are the oil and gas depletion
allowance, which permits a write-off of 22 percent of the gross wellhead revenues limited to 50 percent of net revenue, and the system
of expensing, which allows immediate write-off of much of the initial
costs of exploration and drilling. Various methods of transfer payments can also circumvent the 50 percent of net revenue limitation. 2
The revenue loss to the government due to these various subsidies is
substantial. In 1968, for example, CONSAD Research Corporation
estimated that the total special tax advantages on production of
crude oil totaled $2.25 billion of which $1.5 billion was attributed to
the depletion allowance and $0.75 billion was attributed to expensing.3 The result has been an overall rate of tax payment to the
*Professor of Electrical Engineering, University of California, Berkeley.
**Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics and Assistant Agricultural Economist in
the Experiment Station and on the Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley.
The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to Walter Mead for his helpful
suggestions.
1. National Petroleum Council, Guide to NPC Report on United States Energy Outlook
21 (1972).
2. U.S. Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, Joint Publication of the
Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives and Committee on Finance of
the U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 413 (1969).
3. CONSAD Research Corporation, The Economic Factors Affecting the Leval of
Domestic Petroleum Reserves, in Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, supra note 2, pt. 4, at
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government in the neighborhood of 3 percent for the major oil companies. This extremely low tax rate is due, in part, to foreign production, from which it is often possible to obtain tax credits on foreign
payments such that foreign production is essentially untaxed by the
U.S. government.
In the late 1960's there was increasing pressure from middleincome taxpayers to obtain tax relief by closing loopholes in the tax
laws which allowed some individuals and corporations with large
incomes to pay little in taxes. Prime targets were the oil and gas
depletion allowances. Although these allowances were shared by
other extractive industries, the 27.5 percent depletion allowance in
oil and gas contrasted strongly with the 10 percent or less depletion
allowance for most other mining industries. In the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 the oil and gas depletion allowance was reduced from 27.5
to the present 22.0 percent.
During the period shortly before the enactment of the tax reform
law, there was considerable scholarly discussion of the merits of the
special tax treatment for oil and gas. The discussion centered on the
questions whether the special tax treatment distorted the overall
allocation of resources and whether it was an effective measure to
insure adequate oil reserves. The general conclusion to the first question was that there was indeed economic distortion with excess
capital moving into the petroleum industry. In addition to the
theoretical arguments, the need for output prorationing was pointed
to as an external fact indicating overcapacity. On the second question, statistical analysis indicated that lowering the price of crude oil
would result in a lowering of reserves. But the effect was inelastic,
i.e., less than proportionate, with a 1 percent reduction in price
leading to, at most, a 0.3 percent reduction in reserves. The effect of
special tax provisions on resource allocation within the petroleum
industry is analyzed in the following section of this paper.
In subsequent sections, we examine the effect of the special tax
treatment of the oil and gas industry in the light of new developments and broader energy policy considerations. Superficially, it
might seem, as espoused by the petroleum industry, that in times of
shortages even greater inducements to deplete should be made. However, our findings indicate the contrary. The economic distortion
that results from oil and gas subsidies both encourages consumption
and biases against less favored, nondepletable energy alternatives. It
makes little sense for the federal government to extol the virtues of
energy conservation and diversification while maintaining a tax
policy which effectively does the opposite.
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TAX POLICY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
WITHIN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
The economic literature on special tax provision for the petroleum
industry has been developing over the past two decades. Harberger 4
presented the classical argument against special incentives. Tax
breaks result initially in excess profits, then in a subsidized flow of
capital into production, and finally in excess consumption rather
than "letting the market work." Excess profits can result to the
extent that the tax savings are not transferred to the consumer
through lower prices or to suppliers of inputs to the petroleum industry through increased costs. Excess investment results as existing and
new petroleum-producing firms expand capacity in an effort to capture a larger share of the more profitable market, thus leading to
nonoptimum resource utilization. Excess consumption can occur
when the tax savings to the petroleum industry result in lower prices
which induce consumers to use more. In fact, a mixture of all three
effects results. Many attempts have been made to determine the
magnitudes of each of the effects for both percentage depletion and
expensing.'
Two econometric analyses have been undertaken to estimate the
responsiveness of petroleum exploration to price and, by implication,
to tax incentives. Fisher6 investigated the responsiveness of wildcat
well drilling and discoveries to changes in petroleum prices and other
factors. Shortly thereafter, Erickson improved upon Fisher's work
and concluded that "the overall elasticity of supply for petroleum
discoveries is +0.90."'

A supply elasticity of 0.90 means that a 10

percent increase in price results in a 9 percent increase in the rate of
4. Harberger. The Taxation of Mineral Industries, in Federal Tax Policy for Economic
Growth and Stability 439 (1955) (Compendium of papers presented to the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955)).
5. Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry, 53 Am. Econ.
Rev. 85 (1963); Davidson, The Depletion Allowance Revisited, 10 Natural Resources J.1
(1970); Kahn, The Depletion Allowance and Cartelization, 54 Am. Econ. Rev. 286 (1964);
Kahn, The Combined Effects of Prorationing,the Depletion Allowance, and Import Quotas
on the Cost of Producing Oil in the U.S., 10 Natural Resources J. 54 (1970); McDonald,
Percentage Depletion and the Allocation of Resources: The Case of Oil and Gas, 14 Nat'l
Tax J. 323 (1961); McDonald, Distinctive Tax Treatment of Income from Oil and Gas
Production, 10 Natural Resources J. 97 (1970); Mead, The System of Government Subsidies
to the Oil Industry, 10 Natural Resources J.113 (1970).
6. F. Fisher, Supply and Costs in the U.S. Petroleum Industry: Two Econometric Studies
1-40 (1964).
7. E. Erickson, Economic Incentives, Industrial Structure, and the Supply of Crude Oil
Discoveries in the U.S., 1946-1958-59 40 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1968).
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discovery from wildcat drilling. It should be borne in mind, however,
that the analysis investigated only wildcat drilling, i.e., exploratory
drilling in unproven areas. This is only a small fraction of total exploratory drilling; furthermore, the transition from discovery to reserves through development drilling is not incorporated in the analysis. Thus, while it is tempting to argue on the basis of the 0.90
wildcat-discovery elasticity that the industry is quick to turn incentives into reserves, it is best to heed a comment by Fisher:
This analysis has applied strictly to wildcat drilling and to total
amounts of oil and gas in known fields. This is not the same as
performing the more directly relevant analysis of the responses to
economic incentives of other exploratory and development drilling
and of known and readily available oil and gas reserves. 8
A relevant analysis was performed by the CONSAD Research
Corporation for the Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Treasury
Department in 1968. In this analysis an inventory model was developed for the industry which related reserves (inventory) to the
market price of crude oil relative to the cost of acquiring reserves and
to the level of production. Depending on the functional forms and
lag variables assumed, reserve relative price elasticities ranged from
0.020 to 0.173. 9 Since these are very low elasticities, the CONSAD

researchers chose to use in the remainder of their analysis a conservatively high elasticity of 0.270 which was one standard deviation
above their highest estimate. Based on this estimate, they conclude:
"The result of elimination of percentage depletion would be a 3.1%
reserve decline. The result of eliminating intangible expensing would
be a 4.0% decline in reserve levels, and the results of both would be a
7.1% decline." 1 0 Using their mean estimate of the elasticity (0.122),
the estimate of the percentage change in reserves is less than half of
the above.
The CONSAD analysis also overestimates the effect of depletion
and expensing on reserves by considering them as equivalent to price
increases and by assuming that the demand for petroleum is perfectly
inelastic. With a demand elasticity of about -1, the increase in the
quantity demanded results in a change in price only half as great.
The beneficial effect of the depletion allowance on reserves is
further reduced when marginal production is properly considered.
8. Fisher, supra note 6, at 38.
9. CONSAD Research Corporation, supra note 3, at 12-5. The inventory model approach
used by CONSAD has methodological problems readily conceded by its authors. As this is
the only econometric analysis available, we rely on their estimates as an "order of magnitude" starting point for our analysis.
10. Id. at 8.3-8.4.
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Percentage depletion is more advantageous to firms with higher
profits. This effect is demonstrated more fully in a mathematical
model (see Appendix). Here we will show how this operates using
natural gas as an example. In 1970 the finding rate for gas was 2 x
l0' cubic feet per foot drilled, with an average drilling cost of $26
per foot, giving a drilling cost of $0.13/10' cubic feet. At that time
the price of gas was $0.17/10' cubic feet, leaving little incentive for
new drilling. Finding rates have, in fact, been decreasing sharply.'
The depletion allowance only slightly increases the incentive for
unprofitable drilling; moreover, it is an impediment to granting price
increases since it increases the windfall profits that accrue to low-cost
producers.
To understand in detail the dynamics of increasing reserves, attention must also be given to the distinction between extensive and
intensive margins; i.e., reserves can be increased both by extending
development to new fields and by intensifying recovery in already
developed fields. Little distinction between these two margins has
been made in the literature. On the intensive margin, approximately
an additional one-fourth to one-third of the 300 billion barrels of oil
remaining in already developed reservoirs could be produced using
more expensive, intensive recovery techniques. The National Petroleum Council estimates that 28.5 billion barrels of oil between 1971
and 1985 will be added to reserves through secondary recovery programs costing an additional $0.25-$0.60 per barrel and tertiary programs costing an additional $1.00-$1.25 per barrel. 1 2 For fields that
could benefit from secondary and tertiary recovery techniques, such
as a large proportion of the fields with stripper wells, costs are
already sufficiently high that the depletion allowance has a negligible
impact on the decision to institute the advanced recovery techniques.
We conclude that the depletion allowance has a minimal effect on
reserves; its main effect within the industry is to favor the extensive

margin over the intensive margin.
The expensing of intangible drilling and development costs reduces
tax costs directly and thus leads to increased activity on the margin
and consequently tends to increase reserves. The analysis of the
CONSAD report shows that even in this case the effect is small.
Expensing and the depletion allowance share the characteristic of
favoring the extensive margin. Secondary recovery techniques and
the intensive margin generally entail higher material, monitoring, and
management costs and lower capital costs than the extensive margin.
Even if capital were treated the same on the two margins, expensing
11. National Petroleum Council, supra note 1.
12. Id.
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would increase supply from the extensive margin more than from the
intensive margin due to the difference in capital intensities. But
capital is treated differently on the two margins. Intangible costs are
almost exclusively defined in terms of well drilling, i.e., the extensive
margin. On the other hand, "equipment costs" which are depreciated
over time include both the acquisition and installation costs of nonwell-drilling equipment.' ' Secondary recovery capital would fall
largely into the latter category. Thus, expensing favors the intensive
margin both because of the increased use of capital on the extensive
margin and because a smaller proportion of the capital on the intensive margin can be expensed.
The different tax treatment of the two margins has environmental
and social consequences as well: increased recovery from existing
fields entails few additional environmental conflicts. The area has
already undergone development and subsequent environmental disruption is minimal. Extending the period of recovery can extend the
useful life of pipelines and other equipment and postpone the economic decline and social disruption of dependent communities. Expansion on the extensive margin has pushed petroleum development
onto the Outer Continental Shelf and to the North Slope of Alaska.
These environments are being disturbed significantly for the first
time, and conflicts between petroleum and other values and potential
uses are occurring.
Another aspect of the internal development of the petroleum industry is the advantage given to a vertically integrated company
which obtains its profits from crude production rather than refining.
Kahn has pointed out that, at the 27.5 percent depletion level with
product prices constant, an integrated company would increase its
profits as crude prices increase if it produces at least 77 percent of its
own crude. 1 4 With some major oil companies this is indeed the case,
leading to artificial pressure to increase crude prices at the expense of
refining. The net result has been a squeeze on refinery profits which
has discouraged expansion of refineries. This price squeeze is, in part,
responsible for the refinery shortage we are experiencing today.
In conclusion, this section notes that percentage depletion and
expensing are very inefficient ways of increasing reserves as compared to alternative possibilities. Using the high (0.27) estimate of
relative price reserve elasticity and treating these tax subsidies as
equivalent to price increases, the cost to the federal treasury amounts
to about $0.50 per barrel per year for reserves added through expensing and about $1.45 per barrel per year for reserves added from the
13. S. Porter, Petroleum Accounting Practices 118 (1965).
14. Kahn, supra note 5.
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depletion allowance. Using the mean of the CONSAD elasticity estimates (0.122) more than doubles these costs. The increased
consumption due to decreasing price very substantially increases this
cost. In contrast, in an alternative method of maintaining reserves
Mead and Sorenson have estimated that the true annual cost of maintaining reserves in a field such as Elk Hills is between $0.09 and
$0.32 per barrel.' ' Thus, if the goal of the depletion allowance and
expensing is to increase reserves, one has chosen a very uneconomic
way of achieving it.' 6
TAX DISTORTIONS BETWEEN PETROLEUM
AND OTHER ENERGY SOURCES
Oil and gas account for nearly 80 percent of the energy consumed
in the United States today. Coal, the other major source, accounts
for nearly 20 percent and also has special tax advantages similar to
those for petroleum. Percentage depletion for coal is only 10 percent, but the capital-expensing provisions apparently are more advantageous for coal than for petroleum. This is so because intangible
expenses are a larger fraction of total costs for coal than for petroleum.' ' Uranium accounts for a little more than 1 percent of our
energy but is growing rapidly. Uranium extractors can claim up to 22
percent as percentage depletion and also benefit from expensing provisions. For both coal and uranium-as in the case of petroleumthese tax provisions result in excess capital investment, increased
rents to resource owners, and greater production available to consumers at lower prices. Since about 97 percent of our energy comes
from mined, nonrenewable resources subject to similar special tax
advantages, distortions between these existing sources have been
minimal. We must then ask the question whether 97 percent of our
energy comes from depletable sources partly because of the depletion allowance and whether potential renewable sources of energy in
the future will be suboptimally utilized because of the special tax
provisions for nonrenewable energy resources.
The importance of developing alternative energy sources has been
well established. Hubbert has estimated that we have already found
approximately 70 percent of the oil we are going to find in the lower
48 states.' I Our domestic oil production has already peaked and is
declining. The estimates for reserves of natural gas are similar.
15. Mead & Sorenson, A National Defense Petroleum Reserve Alternative to Oil Import
Quotas, 47 Land Econ. 211 (1971).
16. Federal treasury costs have been used in both cases.
17. Agria, Special Tax Treatment of Mineral Industries,in The Taxation of Income from
Capital 77-122 (Harberger and Bailey, eds. 1969).
18. Hubbert, Energy Resources, in Resources and Man 157-242 (1969).
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Although these estimates may be somewhat pessimistic, in part because the effect of price on supply is ignored, higher estimates only
push the exhaustion of our petroleum resources a few years further
into the future.
In the light of these results, it is evident that consideration should
be given to exploiting our larger energy reserves and to developing
the renewable energy sources. In fact, the trend has been in the
opposite direction. Windmills have come and gone except in isolated
rural areas. Solar power, which had been used for water heating in
the southern states, has been almost entirely replaced by cheaper gas
heating. Close substitutes for energy, such as insulation and building
design, were also given more attention some years ago than they have
been in the recent past. These declines in the use of renewable energy
sources and of ecologically desirable alternatives have been due, in
part, to the real cheapness of fossil fuels and to the tax advantages
that the depletable energy resources enjoy.
A particularly important example of a renewable energy source is
solar energy. It is in plentiful supply and has the additional advantage
of having few detrimental environmental side effects. Used for space
and hot water heating in the home, it causes no air pollution, does
not have to be transmitted over long distances, does not have large
space requirements, and is nearly thermally neutral. Unfortunately,
the development of a solar energy industry faces special problems in
the areas of information, uncertainty, and borrowing because of the
large role played by the many small investors who must choose to
install solar equipment in their homes. It would appear to be in the
public interest to grant solar energy rather than petroleum special tax
incentives.
A study by Tybout and Lbf based on 1961 costs (abstracted in
Table I) indicated that, for newly constructed dwellings, a solar and
electric system was cheaper than an all-electric system in six of the
eight diverse U.S. locations considered.' 9 In two of the eight locations a combined oil and solar system was superior to an all-oil
system. In one location a solar and gas system was possibly cheaper
than an all-gas system. The relative costs of construction associated
with solar equipment installation have risen steadily since this study,
but recently all energy prices have increased dramatically. Thus,
within the range of uncertainty created by rapidly changing conditions, the relative values of the Tybout and Lof study are reasonable
today. Though solar systems are competitive in some areas of the
country, they have not been adopted by homeowners because of lack
19. Tybout & LM5f, Solar House Heating, 10 Natural Resources J. 268 (1970).
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of information, uncertainty, and high interest rates on consumer
loans. This situation presents an opportunity for solar system leasing
companies to develop for the purpose of providing homeowners with
information, performance warranties, and lower borrowing rates.
Indeed, Southern California Edison, a private utility, is currently
experimenting in this form of enterprise.
Under current tax laws, a solar system leasing company would
have no special tax advantages. On the other hand, the special tax
provisions for petroleum and natural gas represent about a 15 percent subsidy. If the low estimates of solar heat costs in Table I are
deflated by 15 percent, combined solar-electric systems are cheaper
than all-electric systems in every location; and combined solar-oil
systems are superior to all-oil systems in three out of eight of the
locations.
TABLE 1
Cost of Space Heat
Location

Solar Heat
Low
High

Electricity

Oil

Gas

1.62
2.07
1.60
1.32
1.76
1.55
2.00
1.73

1.42
0.89
0.79
1.05
1.73
0.96
1.83
2.81

dollars per 106 Btu
Santa Maria, California
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Phoenix, Arizona
Omaha, Nebraska
Boston, Massachusetts
Charleston, South Carolina
Seattle-Tacoma, Washington
Miami, Florida

1.10
1.60
2.05
2.45
2.50
2.55
2.60
4.05

1.84
2.32
3.55
3.16
3.15
4.16
4.05
6.48

4.44
4.76
4.41
3.27
5.37
4.36
2.28
5.03

Source: Adapted from Table 2 in Tybout & Lif, Solar House Heating, 10 Natural Resources J. 268, 308 (1970).

In the same context we can also compare the cost of crude oil
with the costs of more abundant fossil fuels from which oil and gas
could be manfactured and that can supply a substancial part of our
oil and gas needs in the near future. Rubin et al. have estimated the
city-gate prices of oil and gas as converted from oil shale and coal. 2 0
Table 2 presents their results for those processes which are well
advance in the development as of 1970. The costs are compared with
oil between $3.50 and $4.50 per barrel which was a reasonable price
range at that time. One sees that the prices range from 20 percent
higher to almost double the cost of oil. Since much of the cost is
related to conversion and is probably not depletable, the special tax
20. B. Rubin, S. Winter, W. Ramsey & G. Werth, A Rationale for Setting Priorities for
New Energy Technology Research and Development 46 (University of California, Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory, UCRIr51511, 1974).
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TABLE 2
Los Angeles City-Gate Prices for New Supplies of Thermal Energy
Item

Conventional oil
Mined oil shale

Cost, including
Conversion transportation

Mining cost
dollars
per barrel

Unit cost

4-5
0

70-85
10

0
70-85

70-85
80-95

2-4

10-20

60-85

84-123

2-4

10-20

60-85

79-107

cents per 106 Btu

dollars

per ton
Liquified coal
Coal gasification
(surface)

Source: Adapted from Table B-1 in B. Rubin, S. Winter, W. Ramsey, & G. Werth, A
Rationale for Setting Priorities for New Energy Technology Research and Development, (University of California, Lawrence Laboratory, URCL-5 1511, 1974).

advantages favor the continued depletion of our oil and gas reserves
over the development of our larger reserves, using more capital-intensive processes. 2 1 Although oil prices have risen sharply since then,
these increases are due to reductions in foreign supply rather than to
rising domestic production costs, leaving the relative competitive picture substantially unchanged.
THE EFFECT OF TAX POLICIES
ON DEMAND FOR PETROLEUM
It has already been noted that one effect of the depletion allowance is that part of the reduction in industry costs has been passed
on to the consumer in lower prices; coupled with a negative demand
elasticity, this led to enhanced consumption of petroleum. The effect
occurs together with the increased costs arising from less efficient use
of resources and the increased profits accruing to the industry.
In attempting to counter the public's general opinion that the
depletion allowance fosters windfall profits, the petroleum industry
contends that the depletion allowance is, in fact, a subsidy to the
consumer.2 2 At 1.970 prices of $3.00 per barrel for crude oil, they
claim that the loss of the depletion allowance alone would precipitate a $0.50 per-barrel increase in crude price or an increase of 16.5
percent. This is higher than the 11 percent equivalence between the
depletion allowance and increased prices, as given in the CONSAD
report, and appears to assume incorrectly that nearly all the tax
savings are passed on to the consumer. As shown in the foregoing
21. Id. at 13-37.
22. National Petroleum Council, supra note 1.
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section on tax policy and resource allocation, only part of this total
is reflected in lower prices, the rest going to increased costs or increased profits in the short run.
The supply-and-demand elasticities of crude oil are not wellknown at present. Mead, 2 3 in a review of econometric estimates of
the long-run demand for gasoline, argues that the elasticity is probably somewhat greater than -0.75. Another end use of crude oil-that
of generating electricity-has received a more detailed treatment.
Mount, Chapman, and Tyrrell2" have calculated the price elasticity
for residential demand to be -1.2, for commercial demand to be -1.4,
and for industrial demand to be -1.8. The elasticities of crude oil
would tend to be lower since cost is only part of the cost of the end
products. This would be cancelled, at least partly, when fuel substitutability is taken into account. For purposes of the following discussion, we will take the demand elasticity to be -1.
An estimate of the supply elasticity can be taken from the work of
Erickson2 s who found a rate of new discoveries from wildcat drilling
to be +0.9. As argued earlier, this work looks at only a small segment
of the industry and, as shown, could not be translated into reserves.
One might expect, however, that increased production on known
fields would be at least as elastic. This latter component, while increasing supply, would tend to decrease reserves resulting, in part, in
the previously discussed discrepancy between the results of Erickson
and the CONSAD report. The National Petroleum Council estimates
that a change in crude price from $5.28 per barrel to $6.69 per barrel
by 1985 would result in an increase in production from 10.4 million
barrels per day to 15.5 million barrels per day for a supply elasticity
of +1.2. From these results, it appears reasonable to estimate a supply elasticity of +1.
The effects of special tax treatments are summarized in the
supply-and-demand curves of Figure 1. The supply-and-demand
curves for petroleum crude in the absence of the allowances are
shown as the dark lines at plus and minus 450 on logarithmic scales
(elasticities of +1 and -1, respectively). These slopes are illustrative
but also, as one sees, qualitatively correct. The effect of the depletion allowance is represented as an effective increase in price as seen
by the supplier and is tied to the demand curve for clarity. The effect
of expensing is shown as a reduction in the cost of production and is
23. W. Mead, Discussion of Dynamic Demand Analysis of Selected Energy Resources by
H. S. Houthakker, P. K. Verleger, and D. P. Sheehan (presented at Annual Meeting of the
Am. Econ. Ass'n, 1973).
24. T. Mount, L. Chapman, and T. Tyrrell, Electricity Demand in the U.S.: An Econometric Analysis 9, Table 3 (1973) (Oak Ridge National Lab. Report ORNL-NSF-EP-49).
25. Erickson, supra note 7, at 73.
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FIGURE I. The Effect of Special Tax Provisions on Quantities of Petroleum Supplied
and Demanded Assuming Elasticities of +1 and -1, Respectively (The
Competitive Market Equilibrium is at 1,1)

tied to the supply curve. Since there are increased inefficiencies of
production associated with the tax allowances, the crosshatched portions represent the net effective increase in price and decrease in cost
as seen by the industry. Furthermore, the depletion allowance becomes less effective near the margin represented by the truncation of
the depletion area. The net effect is to move the equilibrium point
from Po, Qo to Po, Q. Half of the net difference between price and
cost has been passed on to the consumer in reduced prices leading to
an enhancement in the quantity consumed. This enhanced consumption, as discussed earlier, is a major reason for the ineffectiveness of
tax allowances in providing increased reserves. For the supply-anddemand elasticities as chosen, the tax subsidies have increased consumption by a percentage half as large as the total percentage shifts
of the effective supply-and-demand curves. If a smaller demand elasticity had been chosen, consumption would still increase but by a
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smaller factor. In a world in which the finiteness of our resources is
becoming clearly apparent, this subsidy to consume must surely be
considered to be contrary to society's goals. The special tax treatment has artifically stimulated past consumption at the expense of
future consumption.
Enhancement of demand is not the only demand-related effect of
tax subsidies. Demand is also distorted by making the price of energy
cheaper with respect to other products, e.g., (1) the incremental heat
used in a home is made relatively cheaper with respect to the amortized cost of the insulation necessary to save it; (2) the decision to
buy a large car instead of a small one is based, in part, on the
subsidized price of gasoline; and (3) the amortized extra cost of a
more efficient air conditioner is imbalanced against the cost of the
extra energy used by a cheaper, less efficient one. Although it is
difficult to determine quantitatively the individual distortions of
these separate effects, the overall effect is described in the demand
elasticity. As the current energy crunch makes the consumer more
aware of the alternatives, this elasticity can be expected to increase,
emphasizing the need to eliminate economic distortions favoring
energy consumption.
The question of fairness also arises on the consumer side when the
benefits of a nonneutral tax are passed on to the consumers. Since all
taxpayers must collectively pay the differential required to support
the tax benefits, the small user of petroleum products is, on the
average, subsidizing the large user. The owner of a 20-mile-per-gallon
Volkswagen is subsidizing the owner of a 10-mile-per-gallon Cadillac.
As a final note to the question of our subsidizing energy consumption, it has become apparent that resource limitation is not the only
reason that this is inappropriate economic policy. The question is not
only whether we should subsidize depletable over nondepletable resources, but also how much energy a society can use before the excess
energy consumption creates more social ill than social good. The
unlocking of the vast oil shale resources in the West also promises to
generate large-scale environmental degradation. The employment of
fission reactors on a massive scale raises societal problems of control
of radioactive wastes and of dealing with the possibility of disastrous
though improbable accidents for which we have, as yet, no anwers.
Even the relatively benign solar energy, if introduced for the central
generation of electricity on a very large scale, has its attendant problems of land and water use. Rather than subsidize energy consumption, it is clear that we should be taxing it so that it pays, as far as
possible, for its true societal costs.
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CONCLUSIONS IN THE LIGHT OF
RECENT ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS
The existing special tax provisions produce distortions which increase the real cost of extracting petroleum, result in excess profits
for some producers, and lower the cost of crude oil to consumers.
Because the subsidy is partly passed on to consumers, a larger quantity of oil is consumed in the present, resulting both in less oil for the
future and delays in the development of alternative renewable energy
sources such as solar energy. An objective of these special tax provisions is to increase reserves. Empirical studies suggest, however, that
percentage depletion and expensing together lead to, at most, a 7
percent increase in the level of reserves. Using average rather than
high estimates of the impact reduces this by more than half. Furthermore, the studies did not consider the effects of demand on price
and did not consider the effects on the marginal producer. Each of
these factors reduces the impact on reserves of the special tax provisions by a factor of about two. Thus, the net effect is more likely
between 0 and 2 percent. The cost to the federal treasury is very
high-greater than the cost of simply having the federal government
develop and hold reserves. 2 6 Furthermore, the tax provisions distort
production from the intensive toward the extensive margin, thereby
encouraging the uphill fight to find the last new oil remaining in the
most unlikely places, while up to 300 billion additional barrels could
be rediscovered from already developed fields. A further distortion
takes place in that the special tax advantages on crude encourage
integrated companies to take maximum profits on crude rather than
on refined products. This has been one of the causes of the present
shortage of refineries.
In addition to the distortions within the industry, the tax subsidies
favor depletable over renewable energy sources, such as solar energy,
and favor liquid and gaseous petroleum products over the more
processing intensive recovery of oil from oil shale or the generation
of gas from coal. By reducing the price of fuels, the special tax
advantages encourage consumption and thereby earlier depletion of
our resources.
New discoveries, new technology, and a generally competitive industrial structure have historically kept the price of crude oil low and
falling. Under these circumstances, the industry pleaded that special
incentives were necessary to induce adequate exploration for new oil.
Recent monopolistic cutbacks in foreign supplies have increased
prices dramatically. These higher prices in themselves provide far
26. Mead & Sorenson, supra note 15.
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more incentive than the special tax provisions. Exploration and development expenditures are increasing substantially.
Clearly, neither the public nor their elected representatives will
long sustain special subsidies to an industry reaping windfall profits.
Although the special tax subsidies have long been cherished by the
petroleum industry, this new situation is beginning to change the
attitudes of the industry itself. Atlantic-Richfield has been the first
to break with the traditional policy toward these subsidies. Board
Chairman Robert 0. Anderson has stated:
The oil depletion allowance once had validity and good purpose,
but unfortunately it has become an absolute battlefield for the industry. It's hard to give up a financial resource, but the domestic oil
producers have recently had a low rate of return on invested capital,
and I have a strong feeling that we have to reintroduce the dynamics
of the marketplace back into the industry. 2 7

In a similar vein, Atlantic-Richfield President Thorton Bradshaw has
stated:
The so-called tax breaks it provided with its enactment in the

1920's did provide a good way of compensating for a depleted resource. But since that time it has ceased to be needed and there is no
way of explaining to the public that the oil depletion
allowance is a
28
subsidy to the consumer, not to the companies.

From an industry perspective, their conclusions parallel those of
Kahn and those of this paper.
In the current situation in which the government controls the
price of oil, there is no justification for special tax advantages. Exploration can be encouraged by price increases alone without the
production distortions of the tax provisions. With the elimination of
the distortions, the price increase that brings about an equivalent
increase in supply should be less than the existing tax subsidy per
barrel.
While this paper has emphasized the distortions induced by spcial
tax provisions on domestic production, these provisions should not
be eliminated without making corresponding changes in the tax treatment of foreign petroleum earnings and expenses. Elimination of
depletion and expensing alone would make foreign investment relatively more attractive than before, which would increase our dependence on foreign-controlled petroleum. In addition, foreign petroleum
production is dominated by six to eight large firms, whereas domestic production is far more competitive. A reduction in incentives to
27. San Francisco Chronicle, December 25, 1973, at 1, cols. 2,3.

28. Id.
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produce oil domestically, without comparable reductions in the incentive to produce abroad, would further reduce competition within
the petroleum industry and increase the economic and political
power of the major international firms.
There are legitimate arguments that special tax provisions may be
appropriate for the petroleum industry. The objectives of the industry and the outcome of an individual firm's rational behavior in a
market system can differ from society's objectives and the outcomes
society would choose. Special tax provisions have been advocated by
economists such as McKie 2 I on the basis of risk differences and by
Miller 3" on the basis of land ownership fragmentation which impairs
efficient development and production. The key problem is to develop tax provisions which, in fact, bring the industry's behavior
closer to the social optimum. The most important impact of percentage depletion is to hasten depletion. The major effect of expensing
intangible well drilling and development costs is to encourage the use
of some forms of capital at the expense of other forms of capital and
other inputs. Since the major outcomes of these tax provisions are
inconsistent with social objectives, the provisions should be eliminated.
The Arab oil embargo has shown that increased reserves, coupled
with increased productive capacity, would be in society's interest.
While percentage depletion and expensing may have had a small effect on reserves and producing capacity, the outcome over time was
to drain U.S. resources first and make the United States subsequently
more vulnerable to foreign enbargoes. This was predictable given that
these provisions stimulated the withdrawal far more than the holding
of oil. But other better-directed tax provisions could establish special
reserves and productive capacity effectively over time for use in
emergencies. An unused reserve and productive capacity allowance or
a direct subsidy payment based on reserves and unused productive
capacity would encourage the holding of oil and production equipment. The existence of this excess capacity could eliminate the
threat of foreign embargoes in the present while simultaneously
saving conventional petroleum and stimulating the development of
other energy sources for future generations. In another approach a
negative depreciation allowance or extraction tax could induce the
holding of reserves while, at the same time, it could be tailored at an
approprate declining rate so as not to impede the complete extrac29. McKie, Market Structure and Uncertainty in Oil and Gas Exploration, 74 Q. J. Econ.

543 (1960).
30. Miller, Some Implicationsof Land Ownership Patternsfor Petroleum Policy, 49 Land

Econ. 414 (1973).
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tion from a field. Such a tax could be used to compensate for environmental costs that do not now appear in the supply-demand balance. The much needed development of alternative energy sources
would be given some indirect stimulus through higher petroleum
prices. For other objectives, such as environmental protection or
increasing the competitiveness of the industry, there will be other
policies which would directly induce the industry to move toward
the desired social end. The current tax provisions do not lead to any
of these societal goals.
APPENDIX
Presented here is a simple mathematical model to indicate qualitatively the increased production arising from the depletion allowance
and the insensitivity for marginal producers. The net profits of a firm
are to be
JI= PQ - CQ-T

()

where Q is the quantity sold, P and C are price and variable cost per
unit quantity, and T is the corporate tax. In the absence of the
depletion allowance, it is taken (nominally) that
T = 0.5 (PQ - CQ).

(2)

It is assumed that additional capital will move into the firm as
needed for expanding production, provided the return exceeds a
fixed percentage, say,
II
R =-=0.1
(3)
KQ
where K is the capital required to produce a unit quantity. For an
individual producer, P = constant; and it is assumed that C and K are
increasing functions of Q. For simplicity of analysis, take C = CQ and
K = KQ where the barred functions are constants. Substituting (1)
and (2) in (3), together with the above assumptions, one obtains
P - CQ > 0.2;(4
,Q
_(4)
KQ
and it is solved for Q to obtain the equilibrium quantity delivered:
Qo
+ 0.2K"
(5)
If a 22 percent (nominal) depletion allowance is now introduced,
equation (2) for the tax becomes
T = 0.5 (PQ - CQ - 0.22 PQ);
and with assumptions, as above, one obtains

(6)
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1.22P
S
+ 0. 2K(7)
as the equilibrium. Given the functions selected, the full 22 percent
depletion allowance appears as 22 percent greater production. (Here
one is not concerned with the elasticity of demand.)
For a less profitable producer (one closer to the margin), the
depletion allowance cannot be fully taken but is limited by the requirement that the allowance does not exceed 50 percent of net
income. In this limit the tax becomes
T = 0.25 (PQ - CQ).

(8)

Substituting (6) in (1) and then in (3), as previously, and solving for
Q, one obtains
2
+ 0.133K
(9)
In this case the increase in the quantity produced is related only to K
and is thus generally reduced over the previous case. In the limit
when there is little capital required, such as stripper well operation,
the function C dominates over 0.133K in the denominator in (9);
and there is little additional quantity produced over that without the
depletion allowance. In fact, if the demand elasticity were also considered, as in the text, the price would have fallen in response to the
overall increased production; and the operator of the stripper wells
actually would be producing less at equilibrium.

